BBC Newsnight exclusive interview with journalist Glenn Greenwald on Edward Snowden, the PRISM revelations and mass surveillance.
http://news.techworld.com/security/3467695/report-uk-and-us-spies-have-cracked-blackberrys-bes-encryption/ By Peter Sayer Techworld 09 September 2013
The U.S. National Security Agency is able to read messages sent via a corporate BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES), according to a report by German news magazine Der Spiegel. The purpose of this spying is economic or political, and not to counter terrorism, the magazine hints.
The report, published in English on Monday, cites internal documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
Governments have long demanded that BlackBerry provide access to encrypted messages carried by its email and BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) services, to allow them to monitor for terrorist activity.
BlackBerry has complied in the case of its consumer-grade BlackBerry Internet Service (BIS), notably providing the Indian government with access to consumer messages. Indeed, Der Spiegel cited NSA documents claiming that since 2009, analysts have been able to see and read
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Motorola revela el primer teléfono de la era Google, el Moto X
El Moto X pone menos énfasis en el control manual, en favor de sensores integrados y siempre activos para responder a la palabra, los gestos y el contexto.
lecture: Car immobilizer hacking
Car manufacturers nicely illustrate what _not_ to do in cryptography.
Immobilizers have for a long time increased the difficulty of stealing cars. Older immobilizer transponders defeated thieves by requiring non-trivial RF skills for copying keys. Current transponders go one step further by employing cryptographic functions with the potential of making car cloning as difficult as breaking long-standing mathematical problems. Cryptography, however, is only as strong as the weakest link of key management, cipher strength, and protocol security. This talk discusses weak links of the main immobilizer technologies and their evolution over time.
Speaker: Karsten Nohl
Event: SIGINT 2013 by the Chaos Computer Club [CCC] Cologne
Location: KOMED; Im Mediapark 7; 50670 Cologne; Germany
Begin: 05.07.2013 17:00:00 +02:00
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets.
With over seven billion cards in active use, SIMs may well be the most widely used security token in the world. Through over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via SMS, the cards are even extensible through custom Java software. While this extensibility is rarely used so far, its existence already poses a critical hacking risk.
Cracking SIM update keys. OTA commands, such as software updates, are cryptographically-secured SMS messages, which are delivered directly to the SIM. While the option exists to use state-of-the-art AES or the somewhat outdated 3DES algorithm for OTA, many (if not most) SIM cards still rely on the 70s-era DES cipher. DES keys were shown to be crackable within days using FPGA clusters, but they can also be recovered much faster by leveraging rainbow tables similar to those that made GSM’s A5/1 cipher breakable by anyone.
To derive a DES OTA key, an attacker starts by sending a binary SMS to a target device. The SIM does not execute the improperly signed OTA command, but does in many cases respond to the attacker with an error code carrying a cryptographic signature, once again sent over binary SMS. A rainbow table resolves this plaintext-signature tuple to a 56-bit DES key within two minutes on a standard computer.